We evaluate whether labour mobility is likely to act as a sufficient adjustment mechanism in the face of asymmetric shocks in Euroland. As no adequate data on cross-border migration are available, migration elasticities within nation states (Western Germany, France and Italy) are estimated and interpreted as upper bounds for cross-border migration elasticities between European nation states. Labour mobility is highest in Germany, followed by France and Italy. However, the accommodation of a shock to unemployment by migration takes several years. We conclude that labour mobility is unlikely to act as a sufficient adjustment mechanism to asymmetric shocks in Euroland.
INTRODUCTION
suggests that the degree of external versus internal factor mobility is decisive for defining optimum currency areas: he argues that flexible exchange rates work best if the world can be divided into currency areas within which factor mobility is very high, but between which factor mobility is very low. The lack of factor mobility between the currency regions can then in the face of shocks be compensated by exchange rate alignments. For European Monetary Union, Mundell's (1961) argument means that the euro zone (Euroland) would be more optimal than the former national currency zones, if the factors of production were more mobile within Euroland than within nation states, given the same levels of asymmetric shocks within the respective currency zones. Put differently: on the one hand, a high degree of factor mobility within Euroland is required to compensate for the loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism in the face of asymmetric shocks between Euroland's nation states. On the other hand, though, it is doubtful whether former national currencies were appropriate shock absorbers given asymmetries and low factor mobilities within European nation states.
Previous research concludes that the shocks experienced by the European Union are more asymmetric than those in the United States or in Germany (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993; Funke, 1997) , where smaller countries are especially hit by asymmetric shocks (Buscher, 1999) . Although economic integration may cause these asymmetries in Euroland to decline, differences in tax and social security systems as well as comparative advantage may well lead to a type of integration which creates more asymmetries. Which effect will dominate is an empirical question for the future. For now, it seems safe to assume that the need to adjust for asymmetric shocks is greater in Euroland than in the United States or in the former currency areas of the euro zone. But although there is some weak evidence that independent monetary policies of Euroland's nation states could in the past be used to achieve more economic convergence (Mu Èller and Buscher, 1999) , there is also some empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the volatility of Euroland's former exchange rates had a destabilizing effect on unemployment rates (Gros, 1996a; Belke and Gros, 1997; Stirbo Èck and Buscher, 2000; whereas Jung, 1996 , cannot support this hypothesis).
Hence it is by no means clear that the loss of the exchange rate flexibility between Euroland's former currencies is economically undesirable in itself (Franz, 1998) . Nevertheless, a high degree of factor mobility will be conducive to the success of Europe's currency union. Stirbo Èck and Heinemann (1999) show that higher exchange rate volatility led to a smaller degree of capital mobility in Euroland in the past. Therefore, the euro is likely to increase the degree of capital mobility. Another factor likely to raise capital mobility is the fact that current account targets to stabilize national exchange rates become unnecessary for nation states within the euro zone. This allows a higher discrepancy between savings and investments and hence higher capital mobility than before currency union.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether labour mobility has the potential to act as a short-to medium-term means of adjustment. Although there exists to our knowledge no formal criterion which defines a threshold for labour mobility to be sufficiently flexible to act as a means of adjustment, one would have to expect that migration is large enough to offset significant gaps of wages and unemployment rates between regions within very few years. Unfortunately, though, adequate data on migration between regions of European nation states are not available yet. Therefore, we estimate migration elasticities within nation states and interpret them as an upper bound for crossborder migration elasticities. With one exception, our data do not allow us to distinguish between internal and external migration. Nevertheless, the size of the estimates from the approach taken here allows a judgement on the shortrun equilibrating potential which labour mobility might have in Europe. It will be seen that this potential is rather low.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes empirical studies with macroeconomic data on labour mobility in Europe. In Section 3, the size of the migratory response to unemployment and income differentials in Western Germany, France and Italy is estimated on the basis of data available from Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. Section 4 concludes.
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK ON LABOUR MOBILITY IN EUROPE WITH MACROECONOMIC DATA
Official European statistics do not collect data on migration between regions of different nation states. Therefore, previous studies on labour mobility in Europe either only give rough descriptions of international compared to intranational migration, or compare interregional migration within specific European nation states with interregional migration in the United States.
Articles which present descriptive statistics of international versus intranational migration are OECD (1986), Straubhaar (1988) , De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993) and Gros (1996b) . The results from the observations of these statistics can be summarized as follows: total migration as a share of total population is generally lower in European countries than in the United States. Also, migration in Europe is lower than in Australia, Canada and Japan. Moreover, (im)migration flows in(to) the European Union are of the same order as or higher than interregional migration flows in European countries. This means that labour mobility in Europe is just as driven by immigration as it is by migration within Europe. In addition, migration within Europe is largely migration within European nation states rather than between them. Comparing interregional migration within different European nation states, it is shown that in southern countries (Italy and Spain) interregional migration is less than half as large as in northern ones (Western Germany, France, Netherlands, UK).
To sum up prima facie evidence on migration flows in Europe, it seems rather clear that mobility in European nation states lags behind mobility in other nation states. As mobility between European nation states is much lower than within them, it is plausible to assume that labour mobility cannot be an adequate adjustment mechanism for labour market disequilibria in Euroland. However, it may well be the case that the cause of low mobility in Europe is the lack of economic incentives to migrate. In this case, the conclusion that European labour mobility is too low to act as an adjustment instrument would be wrong. What is decisive to the answer of this question is not the total migration flows between European regions, but the elasticities of migration with respect to economic outcomes such as wages and unemployment rates.
The correlation between migration flows and economic variables has been investigated by Weidlich and Haag (1988) , Eichengreen (1993) , Chies (1994) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) , Decressin and Fata Âs (1995) , Gros (1996b ), McCormick (1997 , the European Commission (1998) and Obstfeld and Peri (1998) . The studies show that economic variables like wage and unemployment differentials are indeed important determinants of migration flows. As expected, high wages favour immigration, whereas high unemployment rates favour emigration. However, migration flows generally take years to absorb economic shocks. Migratory responses to labour market outcomes also vary between countries. Investigations based on regression analysis demonstrate that workers in the United States (and Japan) are more mobile than Europeans within their own nation states. Comparing European countries, mobility in Western Germany is higher than in the UK, where it is higher than in Italy. In general, regional employment shocks in Europe are mainly accommodated by short-run changes in the labour force participation rate, whereas they trigger migration flows in the United States.
To sum up, European migratory responses to unemployment and wage differentials between and within nation states are lower than in the United States. In general, previous estimates suggest that it takes more than a decade for migration to adjust for shocks to unemployment. This holds even for Western Germany, where labour seems to be more mobile than in Italy or the UK (before 1990) (see also Bu Èttner, 1999a, for Western Germany; Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa, 1991, for Italy; Pissarides and McMaster, 1990, and McCormick, 1997 , for the UK). Moreover, Decressin (1994) shows with German data that the migratory response with respect to unemployment is lowest when unemployment is generally high. This means that mobility is low when it is mostly needed.
Unfortunately, with one exception, the studies just mentioned do not attempt to pin down the migratory response to unemployment or wage movements by a number which is easy to interpret. Although Eichengreen (1993) estimates a coefficient on the lagged unemployment rate with the immigration rate as the dependent variable, no sample means are provided in his paper, so that a statement`1 percent more unemployed people causes x percent of the population to migrate' cannot be made from his paper without ad hoc assumptions. The same is true for the contribution of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) . Decressin and Fata Âs (1995) , on the other hand, estimate that in the European Union almost 0 per cent of a shock in labour demand is reflected by migration one year after the shock. Two, three and four years after the shock, the shares are 27, 45 and 80 per cent, respectively. By contrast, in the United States 52 per cent of a shock in labour demand is accommodated by migration already in the first year after the shock.
Using a somewhat different methodology, smaller regional units, and more recent data than Decressin and Fata Âs (1995) , we estimate the short-run response of migration to changes in unemployment rates and incomes in the following section.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we estimate the short-run impact of alterations in unemployment rates and incomes (gross domestic product, GDP) on migration. The reason we use data on GDP and not on wages is that complete and consistent wage series are not available. Our model is described in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 introduces the data. We discuss our estimation results in Section 3.3.
Model specification
Our aim is to estimate the elasticity of the migration-induced population growth factor in a region with respect to a ceteris paribus change in the number of the unemployed or the level of income. In analogy to the Todaro migration model (see, e.g., Todaro, 1980) , we assume that migration is affected by the expected level of income that can be obtained at home in relation to the level that can be obtained elsewhere. Thus not only the average income of a region is decisive for its attractiveness for migrants, but also the likelihood of finding a job in that region. This likelihood may be proxied by the unemployment rate. We therefore assume the following model for the migration-induced population growth factor:
where mig denotes net (im)migration, pop is population, u is the unemployment rate, and y is income (GDP). A is some constant. The indices i, n and t describe the individual region, the nation it belongs to, and time (in years), respectively. Taking natural logarithms on both sides of the equation, a log-linear equation can be derived which may be estimated:
where ln A it 0 " i t 4 it . To give an example of how this equation can be interpreted, 1 is the migration elasticity with respect to the number of unemployed persons. That is to say, if the number of unemployed persons in a region increases by 1 per cent, the population in that region will, ceteris paribus, increase by 1 per cent due to migration. The coefficient on income can be interpreted analogously. Note that separate coefficients for the country-specific variables ln u ntÀ1 and ln y ntÀ1 are not identifiable if time-specific effects are estimated for each year, as the variables ln u ntÀ1 and ln y ntÀ1 only have a variation in the time-series, but not in the cross-section, dimension.
Data and descriptive statistics
We use regional data at the NUTS2 level from the Regio databank of Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union (NUTS stands for`nomenclature of territorial units for statistics'). This databank contains inter alia data on the population, births, deaths, unemployment (rates), and the gross domestic Puhani (1999) show the development of the migration-induced population growth factor for these countries. Summary statistics for the data panels of both the dependent and the independent variables in our model are provided in Appendix Table A .1. Comparing the average population size of the regions between the countries (about in the middle of each table), we find that Western Germany has ± on average ± smaller regions (population around 2 million persons) than France or Italy (around 2.7±2.8 million persons). The German regions are on average also smaller in territory than the French or Italian ones. This observation carries some importance, as the share of people leaving a smaller region is likely to be larger than the share of people leaving a larger region given the same relative shock. The reason is that distance is likely to play a role as a cost factor in the migration decision of individuals. When regions are smaller, it will therefore be less costly to move to another region. As we cannot control for these smaller distances within our framework, it should be borne in mind that there is an a priori reason to believe that the estimated migration elasticities will be somewhat higher for Western Germany than for France or Italy due to the smaller size of the German regions.
Because the Hausman (1978) test rejected the random effects model in all cases, we will only present fixed effects models in Section 3.3 below. As the fixed effects estimator only uses the within variation in the panel data, it is important to observe how much variation is lost by neglecting the between variation. Turning to the dependent variable first, the within variation is about three times as large as the between variation for Western Germany, but only around half as large for France and Italy. Hence for the latter two countries, a lot of information is lost applying the fixed effects estimator. For Western Germany, it should be kept in mind, though, that a large share of the within variation is likely to be due to external migration. It is shown that Western Germany has by far the highest mean migration-induced population growth factor, followed by Italy and France (Table A. 
1).
Turning to the exogenous variables, the within variation of the relative unemployment rate is only a third or a half of the between variation. Again for Western Germany the problem is less pronounced than for France and Italy. As concerns relative GDP, the within variation is around a third (Western Germany), an eighth (France) or a thirteenth (Italy) of the between variation. Hence for GDP the within variation is so small that it would not be surprising to obtain insignificant coefficients on this variable in a regression analysis using the fixed effects estimator. Only the variables indicating the change in the unemployment rate and the change in GDP have a greater within than between variation. These variables will be added to the regression as exogenous variables. Summary statistics for the population, the absolute number of the unemployed, the unemployment rate and the level of GDP are reported to inform the interested reader.
In the following section we estimate the migration elasticity with respect to unemployment and GDP differentials for Western Germany, France and Italy.
Estimation results
The estimation results of the migration-induced population change are reported in Table 1 . The explanatory power is highest for Western Germany, followed by Italy (1) (when total net migration is used) and France. However, the explanatory power for the Italy (2) data on internal migration is the lowest of all equations. This observation gives credence to the view that regional unemployment (and maybe GDP) explains the direction of external migration better than the direction of internal migration. Theoretical considerations are consistent with this result: an immigrant into Italy will face similar transaction costs whether he or she moves to Milan or to Naples. Therefore, he or she will go where job opportunities are. For a person living in Naples, it will make a difference whether he or she moves to Milan (positive transaction costs) or stays where he or she lives (no transaction costs). It is therefore plausible that external migrants react stronger to economic incentives within the receiving country than people who already live in that country. This fact might also explain why the explanatory power is highest for Western Germany, which saw a huge immigration wave in the early 1990s.
As can be seen from Table 1 , the only economic variable that is significant in all regressions is the relative unemployment rate. The coefficients on relative GDP have the expected sign, but are insignificant (the coefficients on the GDP variables are also jointly insignificant in all equations). As the within variation of this variable is very small, though, the insignificance of the coefficient is not very surprising. With the data at hand, the effect of GDP may perhaps not be estimated with sufficient precision. The point estimates of the coefficients can be interpreted in the following way: a ceteris paribus 1 per cent rise in the GDP of a West German region leads to a migration-induced population increase of 0.00136 per cent in this region.
The interpretation of the coefficients on relative unemployment is similar: a ceteris paribus 1 per cent rise in the number of unemployed persons of a West German region leads to a migration-induced population decrease of 0.00809 per cent in this region. To make the results clearer, we have simulated the size of adjustment through migration in Table 2 . To stay with the example of Western Germany, a 1 per cent increase of the number of unemployed persons from the mean value in the sample amounts to 557 additional people in unemployment. According to our estimates, the migration-induced population change of À0.00809 per cent amounts to a net emigration of 165 people. Under the assumption that all of the 165 emigrating people are unemployed and Notes: The full sample period is 1985±96; t-values are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors using the White formula; although the time-dimension is small and we have controlled for fixed time effects, a test for autocorrelation of the residuals has been carried out using the method suggested by Breitung (1992, p. 116) : no evidence for autocorrelation could be detected; the region`Corse' has been left out in the calculations for France due to an inconsistency in the time series of that region (information from Eurostat, Luxembourg). Bold coefficients are significant at the 5 per cent level.
Source: Regio 98 databank, Eurostat; own calculations.
immediately find a job outside their original region, migration would be able to adjust for 29.6 per cent of the unemployment shock within about 1.66 years (as unemployment is measured in April of the previous year) after the shock. The corresponding figures for France and Italy are much lower at 8.4 and 3.7 per cent, respectively. When only internal migration is considered in Italy, the estimate becomes even smaller, i.e. 2.7 per cent. It should be stressed that these simulations make some ad hoc assumptions by counting every emigrant as an unemployed person who immediately finds a job outside his or her home region. It is likely that some of the migrants are family members who are not unemployed. And it may well be that some more time is needed until the emigrant finds a job elsewhere. On the other hand, it is assumed that it takes 0.66 years until workers react to an unemployment shock by migrating. On balance, we guess that the simulated shares of the unemployment shock which are adjusted by migration are more likely to be over-than under-estimates of the real shares. Although there are differences in methodology and data sources, our estimates are in many points consistent with previous results in the literature (see Section 2 above). Like Decressin and Fata Âs (1995) , we find that mobility plays a greater role in Western Germany than in Italy. Eichengreen (1993) also concludes that labour mobility is comparatively low in Italy. Having estimated the accommodating potential of migration to be 30 per cent of an unemployment shock at a maximum in Western Germany within 1.66 years after the shock, we conclude with other authors that labour mobility can only be equilibrating in the medium to long run. From our estimates, it would take at least four years in Western Germany until more than half of a shock to unemployment is accommodated by migration. Moreover, it is likely that the geographical location of the large number of external migrants into Western Germany contributes heavily to the comparatively high migration elasticity in this country. If this is the case, the internal migration elasticity might be much lower in Western Germany. This is important, because immigrants to low unemployment regions from outside Germany may even omit unemployment differentials between German regions, yet they do not necessarily lower the levels of unemployment in the problem regions. Therefore, the degree of labour mobility in major European nation states seems to be too low to act as a mechanism to restore labour market equilibrium between regions in the short to medium run. If we assume that the degree of mobility between regions of different European nation states is lower than the one between regions within a nation state (which seems plausible to us), then it follows that labour mobility is unlikely to act as an effective adjustment mechanism in Euroland.
CONCLUSIONS
We have estimated the share of an unemployment increase which is compensated through migration within the first 1.66 years (due to the way the data are collected) after the shock using official Eurostat NUTS2-level regional data for Western Germany, France and Italy. It turned out that in Western Germany, this share is at a maximum 30 per cent. For France and Italy, the figures are only 8 and 4 per cent, respectively. Our own estimates as well as previous estimates of other authors suggest that the size of the migratory response to unemployment differentials is so low that it takes several years, if not more than a decade, for the regional unemployment inequalities to be evened out by labour mobility. One can thus conclude that labour mobility is not an economically significant adjustment mechanism in Europe in the short run. This is true within nation states, but all the more between them, if one assumes that labour mobility between nation states is lower than within them. As a consequence, Euroland may have to live with larger and more persistent structural problems than the United States, where labour is more mobile.
In theory this need not be a problem for the euro. First, it is not clear that the loss of the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism will on average lead to a greater need for adjustment between European nation states: although there is some weak evidence that independent monetary policies facilitated convergence, it also seems that excessive exchange rate volatility was harmful in the past. Moreover, given that inflation rates are now relatively equal in the euro zone, asymmetric wage-push shocks are likely to subside (Boockmann, 1999; Lauer, 1999) . Second, regional inequalities in Euroland are not a problem per se for a common currency. However, it might for the moment be assumed that Europeans will at least in the medium run keep up comparatively high welfare payments as well as regional policies. In such a setting, the euro may increase the demand for public funds on a national but perhaps also on a European level (cf. Bu Èttner, 1999b). Notes: The between data are formed by calculating the means over time by region " x i ; the within data are defined as x it À "
APPENDIX
x i X x , where the overall mean
x is added to equate the mean of all data (overall, between and within). Abbreviations: mig: migration in thousands; pop: population in thousands; u: unemployment rate; y: nominal GDP at purchasing power parities; ua: number of persons unemployed in thousands; i: region indicator; n: country indicator; t: time period (year) indicator; N: total number of observations; n: number of regions; "
T: average number of time periods (years); migration is net migration (total immigration À total emigration); population is measured at the beginning of each year; unemployment is measured in April of each year. Source: Regio 98 databank, Eurostat; own calculations.
